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The “neoclassical synthesis” sticky price model exhibits strange behavior when 
augmented with markets for durable goods with flexible prices. While in the data the 
output of durable goods responds strongly and positively to a loosening of monetary 
policy, in dynamic general equilibrium models a monetary expansion causes the output of 
flexibly priced durables to contract. In an instructive special case in which the only sticky 
prices are those of nondurables, the negative co-movement of durable and nondurable 
output exactly offsets and the behavior of aggregate output in the model is very similar to 
that of a model with fully flexible prices. This neutrality result is special, but the perverse 
response of durables to monetary policy is highly robust. The reason for the co-
movement problem is the combination of a naturally high intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution for the purchases of durables and temporarily high factor prices associated 





      Modern Keynesian theories of the monetary business cycle attribute central 
importance to nominal rigidities. In actual economies, many prices undoubtedly change 
very infrequently, but not all prices are equally sticky and some may be quite flexible. In 
business cycle modeling, however, surprisingly little attention has been paid to the fact 
that some goods prices adjust faster than others. Those multi-sector models that do 
  1consider differential price stickiness rarely highlight the potentially important differences 
between the nondurables sectors and sectors with consumer durables or durable 
productive capital.
1   
This paper investigates a model with both sticky price and flexible price sectors, 
and with both durable and nondurable goods. We find that it is not sufficient to specify 
how large the sticky price sector is relative to the flexible price sector; it matters crucially 
which sectors have sticky prices.  The “neoclassical synthesis” sticky price model 
exhibits strange behavior when augmented with durables goods markets with flexible 
prices. In Keynesian macroeconometric models  -- and in the data -- the output of durable 
goods is very procyclical, and in particular responds strongly and positively to a 
loosening of monetary policy.  In the dynamic general equilibrium model, however, a 
monetary expansion causes the output of flexibly priced durables to contract.   In an 
instructive special case in which the only sticky prices are those of nondurables, the 
negative co-movement of durable and nondurable output entails exactly offsetting effects, 
and the behavior of aggregate output in the model is very similar to that of a model with 
fully flexible prices.  This neutrality result is special, but the perverse response of 
durables to monetary policy is highly robust.     
Why durables?  Spending in the nondurables consumption sector is subject to the 
logic of the permanent income hypothesis, and thus there is little room for consumers to 
intertemporally substitute in response to a rise in the relative price of nondurables.  On 
the other hand, the stock of durables -- and hence its shadow rental rate -- is nearly 
constant over the modest horizon for which monetary disturbances might have real 
effects; the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for (purchases of) durables is nearly 
infinite.  The result is that a small, temporary increase in the relative price of durables 
causes a large shift of expenditure away from that sector.
2 If the prices of durables are 
more flexible than those of nondurables, monetary expansion does indeed raise the 
relative price of durable goods – temporarily, since the effects of sticky prices are fairly 
                                                 
1 Some notable exceptions that do consider differential price stickiness across sectors (and that we will refer 
to later in this paper) are Blinder and Mankiw [1984], Ohanian and Stockman [1994], and Ohanian, 
Stockman, and Kilian [1995].  Only the latter have capital as well as consumption goods in their model. 
These authors do not identify the location of the price flexibility in the capital sector as central to their 
results, though the comment on their paper by Leahy [1995] does.   
2 We have not formally studied the case of storable, though nondurable, consumption goods.  It appears 
that at least some of the logic of this argument carries over to that case.   
  2short-lived. Thus the model will predict that the durables sector contracts in response to 
monetary expansion and expands when monetary policy tightens.  
More concretely, a monetary expansion raises spending at constant prices, 
resulting in increased output in the sticky price nondurables sector, increased factor 
demand, and higher marginal cost. While the markup on nondurables is squeezed below 
the desired level, the higher marginal cost associated with the increase in factor prices 
appears to the durables sector merely as an adverse cost shock; the period following a 
monetary expansion is an expensive time to produce. In the absence of a sufficiently 
large increase in the shadow value of durables, the sector contracts.    
This scenario contrasts sharply with the conventional view of the role of durables 
embodied in informal Keynesian models.  In those models, the desired stock of durables 
rises following a monetary expansion, more than offsetting the contractionary effects of 
the increase in factor prices.  
The mechanism that leads to the contrarian behavior of the durables sector in our 
scenario is a manifestation of the general co-movement problem discussed by Murphy, 
Shleifer, and Vishny [1989]. In multi-sector general equilibrium models, shocks that 
cause an expansion in one sector often have a tendency to cause contractions in other 
sectors.  For example, in a real business cycle model, temporarily favorable technology 
shocks in the consumption sector also cause a contraction in the durables sector and tend 
not to raise aggregate output – essentially for the same reasons. Temporary technology 
shocks are analogous to the temporary deviations in the markup (or “real marginal cost”) 
in the sticky price model.   
If there were no particular reason to believe that durables prices are, in fact, more 
flexible than prices of non-durable goods, our results would be of mostly academic 
interest. However, there are reasons to believe that durables prices are relatively flexible. 
One indication that durable goods prices have more flexibility is in the fact that the 
relative price of durables to nondurables falls in response to a monetary contraction. 
Following the Romer dates, the price of new houses falls by almost 10% relative to the 
CPI for nondurables. Automobile prices and the CPI for durable goods fall by roughly 
5% relative to the CPI for nondurables.  
  3There are also conceptual reasons to expect durables prices to be more flexible 
than prices of nondurables (except when the latter are purchased in large lots as producer 
goods). As a matter of a priori theory, durables are different because they are relatively 
expensive on a per-unit basis. If the explicit and implicit costs of negotiation have an 
important fixed component (i.e. one that is independent of the price of the good), there is 
more incentive to negotiate on the price of a durable good (see also Leahy [1995]). 
Furthermore, large durables often require considerable customization; this in itself 
necessitates negotiations, and the discussions about the exact nature of the good to be 
supplied are likely to be accompanied by negotiations about price. Zabracki, et al. [2002] 
present evidence obtained “in the field” on negotiations between customers and sales 
representatives of a large supplier of industrial durables to businesses, many of them with 
large accounts.  They show that salesmen do in fact have (and exercise) considerable 
leeway to offer “deals” to major customers who express dissatisfaction with increases in 
list price. Finally, some durables are priced for the first time when they are sold. For 
instance, new houses do not have a price until they are sold.  
  Important previous papers that have studied modern business cycle models with 
flexible and sticky price sectors include Ohanian and Stockman [1994] and Ohanian, 
Stockman, and Kilian [1995]. The former does not include a durables sector, but it does 
feature a variable intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption in the two 
consumption sectors. As we emphasize later, the naturally high intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution in durable goods spending plays a central role in our paper. Ohanian, 
Stockman, and Kilian [1995] feature capital and present simulations displaying both 
perverse movements of the durables sector (although their exogenous one-period price 
stickiness cuts off the mechanism rather abruptly). Those authors do not analyze the 
underlying economics behind their simulation results; the present paper lays bare the 
conceptual underpinnings. The insightful comment on Ohanian et al. by Leahy [1995] did 
touch on many of the important economic effects but does not present our neutrality 
result, and thus leaves it something of a mystery as to why the overall output effect in 
Ohanian et al. is so close to zero.   
In the next section we briefly document the pronounced behavior of durables 
sectors following monetary contractions. Not surprisingly, both the quantity and the 
  4relative price of durables fall sharply after such a contraction. These empirical facts set 
the stage for our analysis of the sticky price mechanism in environments with flexibly 
priced durables. Section 3 presents the basic framework used in the analysis. Sections 4 
and 5 present the two main puzzles in our paper: the robust co-movement problems in the 
durable goods sectors and the potential for monetary neutrality in models with significant 
nominal rigidity. Section 6 presents simulations of the model and some extensions. 
Section 7 discusses possible resolutions to the co-movement problem. Section 8 
concludes. 
 
2. Response of Durable Goods Markets to Monetary Disturbances: 
Stylized Facts  
The fundamental theme of this paper is the tension between theory and data with 
respect to the behavior of durable goods markets following a monetary policy 
disturbance. In the succeeding sections, we will demonstrate that dynamic general 
equilibrium sticky price models predict that an expansion in the production of flexibly 
priced durable goods accompanies the fall in their relative price in response to a monetary 
contraction.  In this section, we establish that the durable goods puzzle is not merely an 
esoteric implication of theory, devoid of empirical relevance.  We examine time series 
data on the prices and outputs of several categories of durables in the periods surrounding 
contractionary shifts in monetary policy. Durables prices are indeed more flexible than 
the prices of nondurables, in the sense that the relative prices of durables fall markedly 
following monetary contractions, and rise following monetary expansions.  Production of 
durables, however, exhibits dramatic monetary policy “responses” of the conventionally 
presumed sign – in sharp contrast to the predictions of the model.  
In recent literature, the most common approach to empirical study of monetary 
policy effects is to examine impulse responses to “identified” monetary policy shocks 
from a structural vector autoregression. Structural VARs have the advantage that, in the 
best case, they identify the truly exogenous component of monetary policy.   However, in 
excluding from consideration the systematic component of monetary policy (e.g. the 
tendency of the central bank to contract in response to the worsening of inflation) 
  5structural VARs miss the lion’s share of variation in the monetary policy instrument. In 
practice, the innovations in the federal funds rate may not be truly exogenous changes in 
monetary policy but rather the result of misspecification, omitted variables, or 
uninterruptible noise.   Finally, we suspect nonlinearities that render the results of 
occasional large interventions particularly potent.   Thus, our preference is to focus on the 
economy’s behavior following a few clear-cut and dramatic changes in monetary policy.
3 
Specifically, we use the well-known Romer dates as indicators of pronounced 
monetary tightness.
4  The advantages of this approach are that our attention is drawn to 
the most drastic changes in monetary policy and that it allows for the possibility that the 
important parts of monetary policy may be systematic. This approach has shortcomings.   
We would not even begin to claim that these monetary tightenings are exogenous.  As 
Shapiro (1992) demonstrates, Romer dates tend to occur when inflation is high and rising 
and unemployment is low.  The “shocks” we identify are few in number and are not 
ranked by magnitude.  Finally, there is reason to believe that the Romer dates come too 
late to catch the inception of monetary tightenings (Bernanke and Mihov, [1998]) – a 
problem that is mitigated, however, by the flexible approach taken below.  
We document the behavior of several economic variables before and after these 
events.
5 For any variable in levels we take the averages of xt+j /xt  given that t is a romer 
date for j = -4, … 16. We compare this series with the averages of xt+j /xt  for all dates 
(again for j = -4, … 16). The resulting series give us a window of observation on the 
economy during these episodes. We look before the date itself (i.e. before j = 0) to see the 
events “leading up” to a Romer date. In addition, we suspect that Romer dates may lag 
the actual changes in policy. Bernanke and Mihov [1998] argue that Romer dates occur 
when their index describing the stance of monetary policy (the Bernanke-Mihov index) is 
                                                 
3Because there is not universal agreement on the relative merits of the two approaches, in an appendix we 
present a VAR for several of the variables that we are interested in. Qualitatively, the two procedures give 
strikingly similar results. Specifically, durables respond more than nondurables to monetary policy 
“shocks” and the relative price of durables to nondurables is positively related to monetary expansions.  
The effects are statistically significant and quantitatively nontrivial.  However, not surprisingly, the 
magnitudes of the VAR impulse responses are more modest.   
4 The six Romer dates all correspond to monetary contractions.   Barsky and House (in preparation) 
combine the information in the Romer series and the Bernanke-Mihov series to construct an analogue of 
the Romer dates for monetary expansions.   We find that the effects of these monetary expansions on the 
durables markets are similar (with opposite sign) to the effects of the Romer dates, and if anything are even 
larger in magnitude.  
5 This approach goes back to Burns and Mitchell and  was used recently in Doyle and Faust [2001]. 
  6at a trough. This suggests that the actual change in monetary policy was made prior to the 
date.  
Before proceeding to the results we should make a remark concerning the 
interpretation of the “trend” by which we mean the path of the ratios xt+j /xt over the 
horizon j = -4, … 16, averaged over all dates. Statistically, this average path is the best 
predictor of the relative size of the variable x, j periods after (or before) an arbitrary date 
t. Economically, this corresponds to the trend growth rate. For some variables following a 
Romer date, there is a tendency to fall below “trend” and not recover. This is due to the 
fact that the timing of the Romer dates is endogenous. Typically Romer dates occur when 
the economy is “above trend”. So, when a variable falls relative to its trend growth path, 
some of the response should be interpreted as simple mean reversion. Again, we are not 
claiming that these effects are due to exogenous changes in Federal Reserve policy.  
Figures 1.a, 1.b, and 1.c show the average behavior of several economic variables 
in the quarters following a Romer date. One thing to notice is that the response of these 
variables is much more dramatic than responses following “shocks” in a VAR. The main 
reason for this difference is that the “events” we are considering (i.e. Romer dates) do not 
correspond to small “shocks” to a stable monetary policy rule but rather represent a 
fundamental change in monetary policy. In a typical VAR system, a 1% shock to the 
federal funds rate reverts to a “normal” level quickly and induces only mild responses in 
GDP and the components of production. Following a Romer date, the federal funds rate 
continues to increase by roughly 4 points (400 basis points). In fact, the rise in the funds 
rate is more than this when we take into account the fact that interest rates were rising 
before the Romer event (see Figure 1.c).  
There are several regularities to point out. First, from Figure 1.a, we see that 
following a Romer date, durable goods sectors contract very sharply while nondurable 
goods (and overall GDP) do not. Relative to levels in the reference period (the Romer 
date), housing starts fall by approximately 33%. The trough occurs seven quarters after 
the Romer date. Starts remain more than 20% below the reference level for nine quarters 
(from t+4 until t+12). Real residential investment also falls substantially. After nine 
quarters, residential investment is 22% lower than it was in the reference date. Real 
automobile sales fall by 25% after eight quarters. They remain more than 10% below the 
  7level in the base date for eight quarters (from t+4 until t+11).
6 Finally, real durables 
purchases fall by 12.5% relative to the reference date. The trough occurs eight quarters 
after the event. In contrast, nondurables and GDP as a whole react much less 
dramatically. Real purchases of nondurables rise above “trend” immediately following 
the event (although insignificantly) and fall below “trend” after seven quarters. Real GDP 
does not fall relative to its level in the reference date. Relative to “trend” it falls by 6%.
7  
In addition to the large effects on durables spending there are significant changes 
in the relative prices of durables and nondurables following a Romer date. The price of 
new houses relative to the CPI for nondurables falls by 12% in comparison to the 
reference date.
8 The trough occurs nine quarters after the Romer date. The relative price 
of cars (measured by the CPI for new autos relative to the CPI for nondurables) falls by 
more than 6% relative to the base date after five to seven quarters. Note that the relative 
price of cars has been falling over time (as shown by the dashed line) so this drop is not 
as significant. Relative to “trend” the maximum drop is only 5%. The price of durables 
relative to non-durables (both measured by their respective CPIs) falls by 4.8% relative to 
the reference date (again the trend for the relative price of durables is negative; relative to 
the trend growth rate, the drop is only 3.7%).  
Figure 1.c shows the unemployment rate, the federal funds rate, the rate of 
inflation and the total level of employment. All of these variables respond according to 
conventional wisdom. The unemployment rate rises by almost 3% following a Romer 
date. Total employment falls only slightly though it has a much slower rate of growth 
than average. According to our data, the average increase in the federal funds rate is 
almost seven percentage points from four periods before the Romer date to seven quarters 
afterwards. Most of this increase is due to the very sharp increases in interest rates in the 
early 1980s. Interestingly, following Romer dates, inflation continues to rise. It does not 
begin to drop until three years after the base date.  
To summarize, durables respond very significantly to changes in monetary policy 
while nondurables are not strongly affected. Following a monetary contraction, durable 
goods (houses, cars and aggregate real durables) all contract sharply. In particular, 
                                                 
6 The point estimate is below 10% again 13 quarters following the shock (but not in quarter 12).  
7 Aggregate employment follows a similar pattern (Figure 1.c).  
8 This number is for the median house price. The number for the average house price is similar.  
  8housing starts fall by more than 30%. In addition, the relative price of durable goods to 
nondurable goods appears to fall significantly after a monetary contraction. Among the 
more significant sectors in this regard is the housing sector. The relative price of houses 
to nondurables falls by roughly 10% relative to its level on the date of the policy shift. 
 
3. Framework 
In this section, we consider a dynamic economy with many industries or sectors. 
Some industries produce durable goods while the others produce non-durables. In 
addition, some of the goods have sticky prices while others have flexible prices. We 
assume that there is at least one industry that produces durables and has flexible prices.  
For this simple model we will assume that capital is fixed in each industry and 
that labor can flow freely across industries. Later we will relax both of these assumptions. 
One consequence of labor mobility is that the nominal wage rate Wt will be the same 
across industries.  
Because our focus is on the role of sticky prices in the business cycle, we assume 
that firms have constant desired markups over their marginal costs of production. Any 
deviations from these desired markups must come from nominal rigidities. Said 
differently, the sticky prices in the final goods markets do all of the work in our model. 
 
3.1 Household behavior 
Consumers get utility from both nondurable consumption goods and durable 
consumption goods. We denote a typical durable good as djt and a typical nondurable 
good as cjt. Total utility is time separable and additively separable in labor. 
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Nt is labor supplied at date t. The additive separability of labor is important for our 
results. We will return to this point later. 
Let xjt denote the net purchases of type j goods at time t. The household's nominal 
budget constraint is then simply: 
  9 
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where Πt are profits returned to the consumer through dividends, Tt are nominal transfers 
(or taxes), St is nominal savings and it is the nominal interest rate. Notice that for 
nondurable goods cjt = xjt while for durable goods we have: 
 
( ) j jt jt jt d x d δ − + = − 1 1 . 
 
We allow for different rates of physical depreciation for different durable goods. 
 
Labor Supply and the Demand for Goods and Services 
Taking prices as given, the consumer chooses xjt and Nt to maximize utility. Let λt 
be the marginal utility of an additional dollar of income at time t and let γjt be the 
marginal utility of acquiring an additional unit of good j (good j can be either a durable 
good or a nondurable good). 
Purchasing an additional amount of any good results in the following change in 
utility:  
  jt t jt P γ λ − . (1.1) 
 
If the consumer is maximizing utility, this must be zero. These conditions (one for each 
good j) imply that the marginal utility per dollar must be equal across goods and jointly 
represent the consumer's demand functions given the amount of money he wishes to 
spend. 
The first order condition for the supply of labor (Nt) satisfies v′(Nt) = λt Wt. 
Combining this with (1.1) gives a set of conditions that relate labor supply to the demand 
for goods and services: 
  () ' t
t
jt




  10This says that the utility cost of an additional unit of labor must be exactly balanced by 
the benefit of having Wt extra dollars to spend on any of the goods in the economy. This 
condition must hold for every good j. 
 
Money Demand 




jt jt t x P M . 
Here, M is the nominal money supply (the "velocity" of money is 1). Money is injected 
into the economy through lump sum transfers Tt to the agents (Tt can be negative). Of 
course, money demand might also be related to the nominal interest rate (an "LM curve") 
or other macroeconomic variables. Modifying the model to allow for such interactions is 
easy and does not alter our basic findings. The important feature of money demand is that 
when the money supply increases, firms have incentives to raise their prices. 
 
3.2 Firm Behavior 
Firms convert labor input into outputs according to their production functions. 
 
( ) jt j jt n F x =  
We allow for each firm to have a different production function. We assume that each Fj 
satisfies   and  so that all production has non-increasing returns to scale in 
labor.  
0 '> j F 0 ' ' ≤ j F
The firms set nominal prices at or above nominal marginal costs. If the firms are 
competitive then Pjt = MCjt while if they are monopolistically competitive Pjt = µjt MCjt 
where µjt > 1 is a markup. The nominal marginal cost of producing an extra unit of output 
is the cost of hiring an additional unit of a production input times the number of inputs 
required to produce an additional unit. In this simple case, labor is the input to production 
so MCjt = Wt ((∂n)/(∂q))=Wt [MPjt
N]
-1 where MPjt
N is the marginal product of labor. 
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The precise form of sticky prices is not important for our basic results. In the 
simulations presented in the paper we adopt a Calvo price setting structure. For now all 
that we require is that nominal rigidity prevents some firms from maintaining their 
desired markups. Firms with sticky prices will have effective markups that change 
following a monetary shock. Some firms that had "correct" markups will not be able to 
readjust their prices in the face of a shock. Furthermore, firms that can reset their price 
now (or that endogenously choose to incur a “menu cost” to adjust their price) may 
decide to set a price that makes their actual markup different from their long-run desired 
markup. Setting the price to generate the current desired markup may cause the firm to be 
stuck with a price that is incorrect for future periods. Thus for firms with sticky prices, µjt 
will fluctuate with changes in the money supply. This is the driving force behind modern 
sticky price models. 
Firms with perfectly flexible prices simply maintain their desired markups – so 
for these firms µjt = µj. This last feature stems directly from the assumption that firms 
desire constant markups over their marginal costs of production. In a model in which 
desired markups vary endogenously with the business cycle, even the flexible price firms 
could behave as though they had sticky prices.  
 
4. The Co-movement Problem 
Consider an expansion in the money supply. Firms with sticky prices cannot 
change their prices and, because P > MC, produce to meet demand. This requires 
increasing employment, which bids up the nominal wage. Flexible price firms raise prices 
to cover the increase in nominal marginal costs which come from rising nominal wages. 
Industries with sticky prices experience expansions in production and employment. But 
what happens in industries with flexible prices? 
There are good reasons to expect flexible price firms to curtail production 
following a monetary expansion. First, because the flexible price goods maintain their 
markups while the sticky price goods see their effective markups fall, flexible price goods 
become relatively more expensive than sticky price goods. The rise in the relative price 
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products.  
Second, to the extent that employment rises following a monetary expansion, real 
wages will rise. In our model this comes from the increasing marginal disutility of labor 
(v’(Nt)) (i.e. the labor supply curve slopes up). More generally, as the economy expands, 
pressure on input markets (labor markets, markets for fuel and raw materials, etc.) will 
rise. Firms with sticky prices simply “suffer through” these periods of high production 
costs. Their markups are below their desired level but, provided that their price is still 
above marginal cost, they will allow production to expand. Firms with flexible prices see 
things very differently. To these firms, all that has happened is that their real costs of 
production have gone up. Workers who were recently willing to work for a lower real 
wage now require more real compensation from their employers. In the face of rising 
costs, firms with flexible prices should again be tempted to contract.  
While these observations would be sufficient in a partial equilibrium model, in 
general equilibrium models it is not enough to say that, ceteris paribus, a rise in relative 
prices will depress demand, or that, ceteris paribus, a rise in real marginal costs will 
reduce production. In general equilibrium, other features of the economy may change in 
addition to costs and relative prices. In particular, the demand for flexible price goods and 
services may be expected to increase. This is especially true if we are imagining that the 
economy expands after an increase in the money supply. A simple example of such an 
effect would be a complementarity between consumption of a sticky price good and a 
flexible price good. In this case, even though it has become more costly to produce, 
demand may increase enough to warrant an increase in production. If there is enough 
complementarity between goods, then sticky prices in one sector can cause an expansion 
in other sectors even if the other industries have flexible prices.
9 
For flexible price industries that produce durable goods though, these demand 
spillovers will not occur. Under standard assumptions, the demand for durable goods will 
not change much over a business cycle. As a result, for these goods, costs rise but 
demand does not. The only equilibrium outcome left is a contraction for such sectors.   
                                                 
9 See for example Stockman, Ohanian and Killian [1995]. 
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additional durable depends on the total stock of the durable rather than the flow of new 
production. For durable goods like housing, this stock will not change much over the 
course of a typical business cycle. Second, the marginal utility of acquiring a unit of a 
durable is the sum of flow utilities extending into the distant future and as a result does 
not depend heavily on short run business cycle conditions. 
More formally, let j be an arbitrary durable good. The marginal utility of 
acquiring an additional unit of this good at date t is γjt which is: 
 
   (1.3) 






       1 .
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If the marginal utility of durables depends only on the stock of durables then γjt will not 
change much since djt does not move much over the cycle. On the other hand, the 
marginal utility of durables could depend (positively or negatively) on the consumption 
of other goods. If djt is highly complementary with another good (say a good that expands 
during the business cycle) then MU(djt) might change even if djt did not. However, for 
long-lived durables, this will still not cause γjt to change significantly. If the expression 
(1.3) places a lot of weight on future terms (due, for instance, to low depreciation rates or 
low discount rates), then for complementarities with other goods to matter we will require 
very high degrees of curvature in the utility function (i.e. ((∂(∂u/∂dt+j))/(∂ck)) will have to 
be very large) to cause a substantial change in γjt.  
The conclusion we draw from this discussion is that to a first approximation γjt  = 
γj (the steady state shadow value of an additional durable) over a business cycle. This 
approximation will be very good for durables with strong stock-flow distinctions (i.e. low 
depreciation rates). 
Consider a durable goods industry with a flexible price. Because the good is a 
durable γjt is going to be roughly constant. For this industry, the labor supply condition is 
v′(Nt) = (Wt/Pjt) γjt ≈ (Wt/Pjt) γj. Because the sector has flexible prices (by assumption) the 
  14price of this good is a constant markup over its marginal cost Pjt =µj (Wt/MPjt
N ). 
Combining these expressions (equating labor supply and labor demand) implies that: 
 




vN M P j t
γ
µ
=  (1.4) 
 
If aggregate employment rises in response to an increase in the money supply 
then v′(Nt) rises, reflecting the fact that workers are being drawn up their labor supply 
curves. To maintain the equality, the right hand side of equation (1.4) must also rise. 
Since the shadow value of the good (γj) and the firm’s desired markup (µj) stay the same, 
the marginal product of labor must rise. As a consequence, employment in this durables 
sector falls. 
Both durability and price flexibility are important for the strong co-movement 
problem we present. If the good were a nondurable then marginal utility would rise 
quickly with reduced consumption. For a durable however, marginal utility depends on 
the stock of the good rather than the flow of production. As a consequence, production 
can fluctuate wildly without much impact on the flow of utility to the consumers.  
  One feature of the model above is that labor is homogeneous and can move freely 
across sectors. Another way of saying this is that there is simply one aggregate labor 
supply curve governed by v’(Nt). The argument we gave above does not work when there 
are separate labor supply curves for each industry. Industry-specific labor supply curves 
insulate sectors from rising costs in other areas of the economy and as a result might be 
important in mitigating the co-movement problem. Unfortunately, the best this 
modification can do is to render the durables sector acyclical. Because we have already 
seen that durables are the sectors that appear to respond most to monetary policy, we 
regard such acyclicality as a particular case of the co-movement problem.  
  Consider a modification of the model to allow for separate labor supply 
relationships. Utility is given by: 
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where Njt  is labor supplied to sector j at time t and Φ is an aggregator. Previously we 
assumed that Φ was simply a convex function v(.) of the sum of the Njt. To keep things 
simple take Φ to be a sum of convex functions  ( ) ∑ = Φ
j jt j N v . This effectively isolates 
each sector’s labor supply pool (there is no substitution of labor at all across the 
industries).  
  Now, increased employment in other sectors during a monetary expansion will 
drive up the cost of producing only those goods. The pressure on labor markets in other 
sectors will have no affect on the supply of labor in flexible price sectors. The labor 
market clearing condition in a durable sector with flexible prices is now: 
 
  () ()
N
jt j








′ ==  (1.5) 
 
where the second equality again follows from durability (resulting in a constant marginal 
utility γj ) and price flexibility (giving the constant markup µj). This is one equation in the 
one unknown Njt. Thus, in the extreme case of no labor mobility at all across sectors, 
durable goods with flexible prices will not respond at all to monetary shocks. To the 
extent that there is any labor mobility across sectors, durable goods with flexible prices 
will contract after a monetary expansion. 
This special case of the co-movement problem highlights the difficulty that factor 
mobility poses for the model. When factors are totally bound to one sector or another, 
durable goods sectors will not vary with the business cycle. Allowing for factor mobility 
makes the co-movement problem worse. Inputs leave the durable sectors and flow to the 
nondurable sectors causing durable goods production to fall. Thus, although frictions in 
labor reallocation help to alleviate the co-movement problem, they cannot solve it. The 
best they can do is to make the sector acyclical.   
The reason that the co-movement problem is so tough for durables sectors is a 
combination of two effects. First, the demand for these products does not rise much 
because the shadow value of additional durables is inherently stable. Second, the real 
prices of inputs (in our model, labor) naturally rise when the economy expands. 
  16Ironically, one of the reasons for the popularity of sticky price models is that they 
generate procyclical real wages together with monetary non-neutralities. The problem is 
that for sectors with flexible prices, high real wages are simply high costs of production. 
If demand does not rise but costs do, firms reduce production.  
 
5. Sticky Prices and the Neutrality of Money 
So far we have focused on the co-movement problem in isolation. Now we briefly 
turn our attention to the behavior of aggregate employment, output and prices. In this 
section we show that if all durables have flexible prices, production has constant returns 
to scale, and factors can move freely across sectors, then money is neutral with respect to 
aggregate output and employment regardless of the degree of nominal rigidity in the 
nondurables sectors.
10 The percentage change in the aggregate price index (the model’s 
version of the GDP deflator) will be equal to the percentage change in the money supply. 
This will be (approximately) true regardless of how much price rigidity there is in the 
nondurable sectors and regardless of the ratio of nondurables to durables. Even if the 
nondurables sectors have very sticky prices and even if there are many more nondurables 
than durables in GDP, money will be approximately neutral.   
 
Labor Inputs Only 
  The simplest way to see the neutrality result is to consider a case in which 
production requires only labor and that xjt = AjNjt in every sector (so that production has 
constant returns to scale). This implies that the marginal product of labor is constant at Aj. 










N = Ad  we have one equation in the one aggregate variable Nt. The 
other terms are constants because of flexible prices (constant µ) and durability (constant 
                                                 
10 To avoid having a composition of output effect, we also require that all the sectors have the same steady 
state markups. See Basu and Fernald [1995] 
  17γ) in this sector. The level of employment that solves this equation following a monetary 
shock is the same as the employment in the steady state. As a result, aggregate labor will 
not vary over the cycle and money will be neutral.  
 
Multiple Factors of Production 
The neutrality result continues to hold in environments with capital inputs. 
Specifically, assume that production in each sector has the constant returns to scale 
production function: 
 
( ) jt jt jt n k F x , =  
 
(we assume that F is symmetric across sectors). Because factors can flow freely across 
industries, nominal wages and rental prices will be equal in each sector. In addition, the 
firms will always choose a combination of inputs to minimize their costs (given their 
output decision). Since the production function is homogeneous of degree one, cost 
minimization implies that the capital-to-labor ratios will equalize across sectors 
regardless of whether it has sticky prices or flexible prices. Industries that increase 
production do so by hiring capital and labor in the same proportions as other industries. 
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Finally, returning to the labor market clearing condition in the durable goods sector, we 
have: 













  (1.6) 
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Like all of the other durable goods, the aggregate capital stock does not move much over 
the cycle. Because Kt is a “slow moving” component of the model we can safely treat the 
aggregate capital stock as approximately fixed over business cycle horizons. This gives 
us, again, one equation in aggregate employment (Nt) and, as a result, employment is 
(approximately) constant over the cycle and money will be approximately neutral. 
 
Discussion 
The neutrality result is an extreme case of the co-movement problem. It leans 
heavily on flexible inputs, and constant returns to scale in production. Inputs must be 
fully mobile. If there were frictions to factor mobility then when the durable goods sector 
expands or contracts, the effective marginal product of labor will fall or rise in that 
sector. Note that investment adjustment costs are a simple form of a diminishing effective 
marginal product of labor and thus would break the neutrality result easily. 
The constant returns to scale assumption is necessary to ensure that the marginal 
product of labor in equation (1.6) does not move with large variations in employment and 
production in any one sector. As a result, the durable goods sector can expand or contract 
sharply to “free up” or “soak up” resources to or from other industries.  
It is also important to point out that all durable goods must have flexible prices 
for the neutrality result to work. If just one durable good has sticky prices, then following 
a monetary expansion there will be a dramatic expansion in the production of that good. 
Constant returns to scale and fully mobile factors of production will imply an almost 
infinite substitution from flexibly priced durables sectors to sticky price durables sectors. 
 
6. Simulations 
In this section we use a computable general equilibrium model to demonstrate our 
results. To give the reader a sense of how a “normal” sticky price model responds to a 
monetary shock, we begin with a standard New Keynesian model in which both the 
durable sector and the nondurable sector have equally sticky prices. In all of our 
simulations, we model sticky prices with a Calvo price setting mechanism. 
 
  19Symmetric Price Rigidity 
In the benchmark model, prices are equally sticky throughout the economy. We 
assume that the half-life of exogenous price rigidity is six months (i.e. for any firm, there 
is a 50% chance that it will be able to reset its price within half a year). For models with 
staggered price setting, this corresponds to one year of fixed prices. A half-life of six 
months requires an annual Calvo parameter of 2ln(2) = 1.3863, meaning that on average 
firms get to reset prices 1.4 times per year.
11 This is a considerable amount of exogenous 
price rigidity. Bils and Klenow [2002] find that prices of most consumer goods are reset, 
on average, once every four months which suggests a Calvo parameter closer to 3.  
The durable in this model functions only as a final good, not as capital (the results 
are qualitatively the same when the durable functions as productive capital). Production 
is linear in labor in each sector. We assume that 75% of total GDP consists of nondurable 
production. The aggregate labor supply elasticity and the intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution are both set to 1. The depreciation rate for the durable good is 10% annually. 
The remaining details of the model are left to the appendix.  
Figure 2 shows the impulse response of our benchmark model to a permanent, 
unanticipated 1% increase in the money supply. In the figure, C is aggregate production 
(and consumption) of the nondurable good and X is the production of the durable; in 
addition, 100 periods corresponds to one year. While prices adjust, employment and 
output rise. In the first quarter following the shock (the first 25 periods in the figure), 
total output rises by 0.83%.
12 Of course if prices were more rigid the model would 
generate greater responses. For instance, if firms could change prices only once every 
two years (on average) then output would rise by 0.93% in the first quarter. 
Production of the durable good rises sharply following the shock (3.8% in the first 
quarter) while production of nondurable consumption good rises by much less. Because 
the stock of durables does not change much over the cycle, production of the durable 
good can be varied considerably without changing the shadow value of the durable 
significantly. On the other hand, nondurable consumption cannot change without 
                                                 
11 More precisely, the probability of a price being stuck for a whole year is θ = exp{-1.3863}. 
12 The plot makes it look like output rises by 1% because it is plotting the first 100
th of a year rather than 
the first quarter. Note that because output is linear in employment, the employment response is also 0.83%. 
Finally, for the standard New Keynesian model with productive capital, the same experiment implies that 
employment and output increase by roughly 0.79% and 0.52%, respectively. 
  20significant changes in its marginal utility. Said another way, purchases of the nondurable 





Flexible Durables Prices and Sticky Nondurables Prices 
Figure 3 shows the response of the model when only the nondurable good has 
sticky prices. Again, we consider a permanent increase in the money supply of 1%. This 
figure illustrates two of the central results of our paper. First, surprisingly, even though 
the production of the nondurable good accounts for 75% of total GDP, output barely 
changes after the shock. GDP – and consequently aggregate employment – rises by only 
0.1% in the quarter following the shock. Even though most prices in this economy are 
sticky, money is approximately neutral with respect to aggregate employment and 
aggregate output. The source of this neutrality is, of course, the co-movement problem. 
Consumption rises by 2.45% and investment falls by roughly 7% in the first quarter. 
  Notice that both the nominal interest rate and the real interest rate fall after the 
monetary expansion. Thus, even though durables are perceived as “interest sensitive” 
components of aggregate expenditure, the interest rate effect does not manage to raise 
demand for these sectors. 
 
Sticky Durables Prices and Flexible Nondurables Prices 
To show that this result is not simply a consequence of having one sector with 
sticky prices and another sector with flexible prices we now consider the opposite case --
sticky durables prices and flexible nondurables prices. Recall that the durables industry is 
the smaller industry so only 25% of GDP has sticky prices in this case. Figure 4 shows 
impulse responses for the same 1% increase in the money supply.  
Even though durables (the sticky price goods) only make up 25% of GDP, output 
rises by 0.45%. The output response is almost five times greater than in the case with 
                                                 
13 See Mankiw [1982]. 
14 Note that nominal interest rates rise after the monetary expansion. Most of this is due to anticipated 
inflation rather than changes in the real rate of return. In models with capital, increases in employment 
cause the marginal product of capital to rise. The link between the marginal product of capital and the real 
interest rate implies that in sticky price models with capital, real interest rates also have a strong tendency 
to rise (see Tobin [1955] and also Sargent [1987] chapter 3).  
  21sticky nondurables prices. In fact, the increase in output is more than half of the increase 
when all prices were sticky. Notice that the co-movement problem that was so 
pronounced in the first case is greatly alleviated. Although consumption falls by 0.45% in 
the first quarter, durable goods production rises by 3.18 percent. This is much closer to 
the behavior we see in the data.  
This “reverse” experiment shows that it is not simply the fact that one sector is 
expanding while the other is contracting due to relative price changes. Instead, whether 
output and employment respond to money shocks depends on whether the durable goods 
sector has sticky prices. Very flexible durable goods prices result in monetary neutrality 
even if the nondurables prices are very sluggish. However, the opposite is not true. 
Money is not neutral if nondurables prices are flexible but durables prices are sticky. 
Figure 5 plots the response of output in the first quarter following the shock for 
our model as we vary the share of the sticky price sector. In the figure, the solid line 
represents the model when durables prices are sticky. The dashed line is for the model 
with sticky prices for the nondurables sector.
15 As the figure shows, the responses of the 
economy depend importantly on which sector has sticky prices. Not surprisingly, as the 
share of sticky price sectors falls, the output response gets smaller. When the sticky price 
goods are nondurables, however, the output response falls drastically as we reduce the 
fraction of sticky price sectors in GDP. Even when 80% of GDP has sticky prices, the 
output response is less that 20% of the response when all prices are sticky. In contrast, 
when the durables have sticky prices the fall in the output response is much less severe. 
Even when only 20% of GDP has sticky prices, the response of output is still half of what 
it is when all prices are sticky. To the extent that macroeconomists are concerned with the 
real effects of money, we get greater increases in output and employment when 10% of 
GDP are durables sectors with sticky prices than when 90% of GDP are nondurables 
sectors with sticky prices. The message of this experiment is clear: in an economy with 
durable goods, sticky prices are important only if some durable goods have sticky prices.  
 
7. “Resolving” the Co-movement Problem: 
                                                 
15 Because we are changing the share of durables in GDP and because the production of durables is 
inherently more volatile than for nondurables, we normalized the lines by the response when all of GDP 
consists of either the durable or the nondurable good. The non-normalized graph looks similar.  
  22It is difficult to resolve the co-movement problem in the sticky price modes that 
we have considered. In this section, we consider some modifications to our model and 
ask whether they might be part of a solution to eliminate negative co-movement.  
 
7.1 Output Effects 
One way to cause investment in durable goods to rise when the economy expands is to 
explicitly tie such investment to output. Then, even though the costs of production are 
rising, investment might increase due to the expansion in GDP. Here we discuss three 
ways of achieving this: (1) the investment accelerator, (2) the financial accelerator, and 
(3) endogenous countercyclical markups.  
 
The Investment Accelerator 
There are other reasons, beyond consumption smoothing motives, why investment 
(in durables or capital) might increase when output rises. We discuss two of them under 
the general heading of investment accelerators.  
First, the return to capital goods rises when employment is high. Having more 
workers means that the marginal product of capital is high. This could serve to stimulate 
investment. Clearly, the more aggregate employment responds the more this accelerator 
channel will work. If labor supply elasticities are large, employment will rise more in an 
expansion which will increase the demand for capital.  
There are two problems with this story. First, it requires a significant and 
prolonged increase in employment. If monetary business cycles are short-lived, the 
increase in the payoff to new capital will be relatively small and consequently will bring 
forth only a small increase in investment. Second, this interpretation of the investment 
accelerator only applies to durables that function as productive capital. The demand for 
durables that are not used in the production process (residential housing for instance) will 
not respond to changes in employment.  
A second reason that investment might respond to output is complementarity 
between the consumption of durable and nondurable goods. Then, if production of the 
nondurable good expands, the desired stock of durables will rise.  
  23While a high degree of complementarity sounds promising on its face, there are 
additional consequences to this type of demand spillover. Large complementarities tie 
production of nondurable goods to the stock of durable goods. If the stock of durables 
cannot rise quickly, the production of nondurable goods will not rise either. If the stock-
flow distinction is strong enough, then high complementarity will create an additional co-
movement problem in the associated non-durable good.  
In our quantitative model, because the durable has a low depreciation rate, a high 
degree of complementarity strengthens the neutrality result. Figure 6 shows three 
simulations of the benchmark model with flexible durables prices. The top panel is the 
benchmark model we began with. Output does not change in response to monetary 
stimulus, durable goods production falls and nondurable production rises. The middle 
panel shows the same model with a modest amount of complementarity between durable 
consumption and nondurable consumption. Now, in addition to output being 
approximately neutral, industry specific output responds less to the money shock. The 
bottom panel shows an extreme case of complementarity. The neutrality that was present 
only in aggregate employment and GDP has now spread to a neutrality condition that 
holds sector by sector.  
 
Liquidity Constraints and the Financial Accelerator  
Another way to relate investment demand (and production) to aggregate output is 
with liquidity constraints or countercyclical external finance premiums (the financial 
accelerator).  
Suppose that the demand for durables is primarily composed of people who need 
to borrow to acquire the durable. Furthermore, assume that many of these people face 
binding liquidity constraints on their borrowing. These customers would like to borrow 
against their future income to buy more durable goods but they are up against their 
borrowing constraint. As a result, these consumers will spend any additional income on 
durable goods even if nondurable goods become relatively cheaper for them. For these 
customers  dt t dt P λ γ > ; this breaks the link in the benchmark model between the marginal 
utility of an extra durable and its price.  
  24In addition to a pure borrowing constraint story like the one above, many models 
imply that the severity of liquidity constraints is inversely related to cash flow or 
collateral (this is the main idea behind the financial accelerator hypothesis). These 
models imply that in addition to spending additional income on durables, extra income 
will also relax the borrowing constraints themselves.  
 
Endogenous Countercyclical Markups 
Finally, the optimal markup µt for the durable goods producers might vary 
systematically with output. In this case, the sector may behave like a sticky price sector 
even if its prices are flexible. One rationale for this type of behavior is a procyclical 
elasticity of demand. If the marginal customers are the most price sensitive ones, then an 
expansion causes the demand side of the market to become more price elastic. As a 
result, the optimal markup falls endogenously. This will increase sales and production.  
 
7. 2 Production Complementarities 
An important feature of our framework is the assumption that labor is additively 
separable in the utility function. Complementarity between labor supply and nondurables 
can go a long way towards resolving the co-movement problem. As production of 
nondurables expands, labor supply will increase. Increased labor supply will lower costs 
of production throughout the economy and could encourage production in the durables 
sectors if the effect is strong enough. Of course, if labor supply is complementary with 
the durable good then this will reinforce the co-movement problem (and the neutrality 
result). 
Labor supply complementarity is a special case of production complementarities 
in general. Positive externalities in the production of nondurables will reduce the 
marginal costs of production in the durable goods sector and may cause production to 
increase.  
 
  257.3 Sticky Wages 
Although we assumed that the price of the durable good was flexible, if wages (or 
any input price) are sticky then production will have reason to rise following an increase 
in the money supply.
16  
Figure 7.a shows the impulse response function for the two sector model to a 
permanent 1% increase in the money supply under the assumption that wages are reset on 
average once per quarter. Wage setting is also modeled with a Calvo mechanism. We 
maintain the assumption of sticky nondurables prices, and flexible durables prices. 
The sticky wages can easily break our neutrality result. Workers are essentially 
off their labor supply curves so equation (1.2) does not hold. In the figure, the co-
movement problem is still present, though certainly mitigated. While investment is 0.4% 
above trend in the first quarter, it falls below trend over the next two years. In quarters 
two, three and four, investment is below trend by –1.22%, –1.36%, and –1.05% 
respectively. To resolve the co-movement problem, wages need to be fairly rigid. Figure 
7.b shows the same model but with wages set only once every six months on average. 
The co-movement problem is now significantly reduced. Investment is above trend in the 
first two quarters (by 1.28% and 0.2% respectively) following the shock and falls below 
trend only afterwards (in the third and fourth quarters investment is below trend by by     
–0.28% and –0.44%).   
 
8. Conclusion 
Sticky price models exhibit strongly counterfactual behavior when they include 
markets for durable goods with flexible prices. Consumers care about the stock of durable 
goods rather than the flow of purchases. Because the timing and magnitude of durables 
purchases can be varied considerably without noticeable changes in the stock, purchases 
of durable goods have an inherently high intertemporal elasticity of substitution. When 
the economy expands, marginal costs rise throughout the economy. High marginal costs 
combined with a readiness to bunch the production and purchase of durables means that 
                                                 
16 Slightly more generally, if production of durables requires intermediate goods and the prices of these 
intermediates were sticky then real costs in the durables industry itself may fall after a monetary expansion. 
Sticky wages are a particular type of sticky intermediate prices. 
  26when the rest of the economy expands, durable goods sectors with flexible prices should 
contract.  
In a special case in which the only sticky prices are those of nondurables, the 
negative co-movement of durable and nondurable production is exactly offsetting and 
money is neutral with respect to aggregate output. While the neutrality result requires 
special circumstances, the perverse response of flexible price durables to monetary policy 
is robust. We conclude that standard sticky price models require significant additional 
features to resolve this discrepancy between theory and data. 
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  29Appendicies
Appendix A.1: The Benchmark Model.
The following model allows the durable good to function either as a …nal good or as productive capital.
As a result, in the statement of the model, the stock of durables appears in both the production function
and the utility function. We focus on the two special cases in which (1) the durable is in only the utility
function and (2) the durable is only productive capital. The results are qualitatively unchanged if durable
goods function as both productive capital and as a …nal good.
A.1.1 Households:
The household gets utility from non-durable consumption (Ct) and durable consumption (Dt). The





























The CES aggregator has the (standard) properties that as µ ! 1; C and D are perfect substitues, as µ ! 0




t , and as µ ! ¡1 the utility function
becomes Leontief so that Ct and Dt are perfect complements. D are perfect substitutes. If Á = 0 then the
utility function is a (generalized) Cobb-Douglas form CÃcDÃd; as Á ! ¡1 the C and D become perfect
complements. ¾ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. ´ is the labor supply elasticity (³ is simply a
scaling parameter).
Households earn nominal wages Wt. Their nominal ‡ow budget constraint is:
P c
t Ct + Pd
t Xt +Mt = WtNt + Mt¡1 + Tt + RtDt
Pd
t is the price of new durable goods and Xt is the quantity of new durables purchased at date t. Tt is a
(nominal) lump sum transfer which includes taxes, transfers and pro…ts from …rms. We allow the household
to earn a return on their stock of durables in the case in which the durables function as a production input.
In this case, Rt is the nominal rental price of the durable.
The stock of durables obeys:
Dt+1 = Dt(1 ¡ ±) +Xt




































































A.1.2: Production and Price Setting


















30The …nal goods producers are competitive while the intermediate goods producers are monopolistically

































" is the price elasticity of demand for any one intermediate good producer s.
Intermediate goods are produced by local monopolists who take the demand curves (1) as given and














The monopolists are price takers in capital and labor markets and chooses a mix of capital and labor to



















which is …rm s’s labor demand curve for j = c;x. Since all …rms take Wt and Rt as given, they all choose






Intermediate goods producers choose pt(s) to maximize pro…ts. Firms that have sticky prices are modeled
using a Calvo price setting mechanism. The probability that a …rm will have its price stuck is µ so that 1¡µ
is the probability that the …rm can adjust their price.




























t be the optimal reset price (which is the same for all intermediate goods producers s). Then, the





























To a …rst order approximation this implies that total …nal goods are given by:17












The model is solved by log-linear approximation using the Anderson-Moore (AIM) algorithm.
A.1.3: Special Cases:
We focus on the following two special cases:
17Note that the group of …rms selected by the Calvo parameter is a purely random group of …rms. With staggered price
setting models or in sS models, the …rms that adjust have the most outdated prices. In such a case, the “mix” of intermediate
goods would be distorted and production would not be exactly Cobb-Douglas.
31Case I: Durable goods have a utility service ‡ow but do not function as capital (Ãd > 0 and ® = 0). In
this case, production is linear in labor Nt and there is no capital.
Case II: The durable goods are productive capital but do not have a utility service ‡ow (Ãd = 0 and
0 < ® < 1). In this case, production is a standard Cobb-Douglas function with capital given by the
total stock of durables:
Dt = Kt
A.1.4: Parameterizations.
The benchmark parameter values for the two special cases are:
Benchmark Parameterizations
All Case 1 Case 2
Parameter Value Parameter Value Parameter Value
¯ .98 Á 0 Á –
´ 1 C
Y .75 Ãd 0
± .1 ® 0 ® .35
¾ 1
(¯ and ± are annual rates; in Case I
Ãd
Ãc is chosen to give the C
Y ratio).
A.1.5: Wage Setting
We follow Erceg, Henderson and Levin [2000] by modelling wage rigidity as a Calvo sector. Speci…cally,
we assume that e¤ective labor for the …rms is an aggregate of labor “types”. Speci…cally, if Lt is e¤ective
































































so that the real wage is the competitive wage
¡MU(N)
MU(C) plus a markup.
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Figure 7.b : Sticky Wages and Flexible Durable Goods Prices  